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RESPONSE TO CLAIMED INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
While the Company appreciates the role of the State Fire Marshal (the "State") as 
provided under the Idaho Code, the State's desire to be involved in this appeal is 
misplaced. Perhaps that results from the State's misunderstanding of the factual 
background of this matter. The following are some examples: 
1. The Schweitzer Basin Water Company (the "Company") has not 
historically fa.iled to maintain fire suppression flows. The State alleges that the 
Company has historically failed to maintain fire suppression flows at fire hydrants that it 
had authorized to be attached to its water system. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 2, ~2. That 
statement is incorrect, but the State then uses it to try to justify the Schweitzer Fire 
District (the "District") seeking to enforce against the Company an International Fire 
Code ("IFC") provision that requires fire hydrants to maintain constant water pressure of 
1,000 gpm for one hour. Id. p. 3, ~l. In order to gain perspective of what is the actual 
factual background of this case, the follo-wing is a brief chronology of the historic fire flow 
situation at issue: 
A. The original design in the 196o's of the Company's water system was only for 
domestic water. There was no consideration for fire flows. That design was approved by 
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"). R. p. 73. 
B. The District was established March 8, 1987, but there was no firefighting 
equipment and only limited volunteers. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 2, footnote 9. 
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C. The Company applied to the State of Idaho for grant funds in installing fire 
hydrants in 1989 on two (2) existing water systems. The request was denied because the 
water systems were both private. R. p. 45, ,i4. 
D. The majority of the fire hydrants that are currently on the Company's system 
were installed and connected to the Company's water main from 1992 to 1994. Those fire 
hydrants were installed by individual residents and condominium associations before the 
roads were to be paved from funds of Local Improvement District 93-1. Those hydrants, 
and all of the other hydrants presently on the Company's system, were and are privately 
owned. The individual owners and condominium association owners have always 
maintained their respective fire hydrants. Id. 
E. After 1994, the District's fire chief established requirements for installation of 
fire hydrants. The requirements were all related to location, accessibility, etc. There were 
no requirements or references to water flows from fire hydrants. These location and 
accessibility requirements were sent to the Bonner County planning department to use 
when owners/ developers requested a conditional use permit ("CUP") for construction of 
multifamily buildings. The CUP process required approval from the District's fire chief as 
a condition of CUP approval, so that owners/ developers had to meet the fire chiefs 
requirements to install fire hydrants near their developments. R. pp. 46, i15, 94-95. 
F. By letter dated October 13, 1996, the District's fire chief advised the Company 
that he would require 500 gpm fire flow from fire hydrants pursuant to the Uniform Fire 
Code. R. p. 102, il6. 
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G. In the June 14, 2013 Notice of Violations, the District's fire chief informed the 
Company that fire flows at 1,000 gpm would be required from the fire hydrants on the 
Company's system. R. pp. 17 - 20. 
H. Fire hydrants were installed by private parties on the Company's system in 
2004, 2005, 2007 and 2014 for multifamily buildings. Those fire hydrants were 
approved by the District's fire chief as a part of the CUP process. The fire chief therefore 
accepted all of those hydrants. For the hydrant installed in 2014, the fire chief 
acknowledged and documented that " ... ,-vater flows and pressures at this fire hydrant may 
not meet current requirements .... " R. p. 102, i]6. The District's fire chief was using the 
authority given him in IFC Appendix B, Section B 103.1, which provides that the fire chief 
is authorized to reduce the fire flow for isolated buildings or a group of buildings in rural 
areas or small communities where the development of full fire-flow requirements is 
"impractical." Brief of Amicus Curiae, Exhibit C, I.F.C., Appendix B, Section B 103. The 
IDAPA 58.01.08, Section 501.18.b also provides the fire chief with authority to accept a 
system's fire flow capacity. The IFC and IDAPA both recognize that conditions may occur 
where it is "impractical" to achieve full compliance ,vith code standards, and the fire chief 
can accept those conditions. 
The State provides no explanation as to why the District's fire chief would now be trying 
to back pedal by requiring higher fire flmvs from hydrants that he previously approved at 
lower fire flows, or why the fire chief is attempting to selectively enforce the IFC against 
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only one of the four private water companys currently serving domestic water customers 
on Schweitzer Mountain. 
2. Although not designed for fire suppression, the Company's water 
system provides adequate fire flows. Another example of the State's 
misunderstanding of the facts is that the State takes the position that the Company 
should meet the IFC standard of 1,000 gpm fire flow. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 3, ,-J1. 
The Idaho Surveying and Rating Bureau ("ISRB") has given credit for all of the hydrants 
on the Company's water system. The current ISRB fire rating at Schweitzer Mountain is 
a 5. This is similar to the rating in Sandpoint (4), Ponderay (5), Kootenai (5), Dover (5), 
and most other fire districts with similar issues. The ISRB therefore considers the fire 
suppression on Schweitzer Mountain to be adequate. R. p. 47, ,-J5. 
3. The Company has never taken the position that it is exempt from 
the IFC. The State alleges that, because the Company's system predates the formation 
of the District, the Company contends that its water system is exempt from enforcement 
of the IFC. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 3, ,-J:2. While it is true that the Company was 
formed in the 196o's and therefore does predate the formation of the District, the 
Company has never taken the position that it is exempt from the IFC because the 
Company's water system is private. When the Company's water system was designed and 
constructed, the IFC was not in place. Even today, the standards of the IFC are still not 
required to build a water system. Although the District's fire chief has jurisdiction over 
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buildings and structures connected to a water system, he does not have jurisdiction over 
the water system itself. Idaho Code §41-259. 
4. The Company has cooperated to allow owners of real property to 
install private hydrants on its water system and use them for fire protection. 
A fourth example of the State's misunderstanding of the facts is that the State alleges that 
the Company, in 1992, began all0vving homeowners to purchase fire hydrants and pay a 
fee to hook up to its water system. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 3, ,i1. Before the Company 
allowed fire hydrants to be installed, however, starting in its 1992 rules and regulations, 
the Company stated that only domestic water, not fire protection water, was being 
supplied ( R. p. 49, ils) and the Company never charged for connecting a fire hydrant to 
its water system. It is also important to note that, as requested by Schweitzer Mountain 
home0vvners, the Schweitzer Mountain resort owners, and the newly-formed District, the 
Company did allow the water from its water system to be used for fire protection through 
private 0vvners installing their own fire hydrants on the Company's water system. R. p. 
45, ,i4. 
5. The District, in attempting to take enforcement action against the 
Company, cited its authority as being Idaho Code §41-256(1), and the 
jurisdictional authority of the District has been the focus of this case. The 
State alleges that the district comt improperly limited its examination of the issue of the 
Fire District's jurisdiction to interpretation of Idaho Code §41-259. Brief of Amicus 
Curiae, p. 6, ,i1. 'What actually occurred was that the District, in its Ordered (sic) 
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Demanding Repair and Remedy of Deficiencies in Water System dated May 3, 2014, 
stated that the District made the order pursuant to Idaho Code §41-256(1). The District 
did not cite any other alleged enforcement authority. The district court stated its belief 
that Idaho Code §41-259 was the authority that the District was attempting to use to say 
that the District had the ability to order the Company to do certain things, and the district 
court's concern was that section did not seem to apply to what the District was trying to 
accomplish in this case. Tr. March 25, 2015 Order To Show Cause, p. 4, LI. 18-25. The 
district court also noted that the District had not cited any case law to support its 
argument that it had jurisdiction over the Company. Id. p. 4, LI. 16-20. 
6. A decision from this Court affirming the district court would 
uphold legislative intent and would not adversely affect the mission of the 
State or its agents. A final example of the State's misunderstanding of the background 
facts is the State's stated fear that a decision from this Court affirming the district court's 
decision would impair the legislative purpose of the statutes relating to fire districts and 
the State, and would also limit the application and scope of the IFC in Idaho. Brief of 
Amicus Curiae, p. 6, ,i2. The actual result of this Court affirming the district court's 
decision, which was that the District had no jurisdiction over the Company's water 
system, would be to uphold the legislative intent of the jurisdiction of fire code officials. 
A correct reading of the jurisdictional statute would also protect the Company from an 
overreaching governmental entity. 
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RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT 
I. The districtjudge correctly deteirmined that Idaho Code §41-259 defined 
the scope of enforcement authority of the District. 
In Section I of the State's amicus brief, purportedly relating to the jurisdiction for 
enforcement of the IFC, the State appears to be attempting to raise new legal arguments 
on appeal. For example, the State includes a whole section on Fire Protection District 
Law. Brief of Amicus Curiae, pp. 1-2. The State should not be allowed to raise those 
issues for the first time on appeal. "Generally, issues not raised below will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. Therefore, as [appellant] failed to raise these 
issues below, they have not been preserved for appeal and we will not address them." 
McCoy v. Craven, 2010 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 176, *16, 2010 WL 9587468 (Idaho Ct. 
App. May 25, 2010.) 
It was the District's job to raise any such issues at the trial court level. The State 
should not be allowed to add new legal arguments to this appeal. The State has not 
shown from the record that the District raised the legal issues during the proceedings in 
this case, or that the district court erred in its consideration of the issues. 
"It is a general rule of wide application that an appellate 
court will indulge all reasonable presumptions in favor of the 
correctness of the judgment, order, or decree from which the 
appeal was taken. In other words it Ylrill be presumed on 
appeal, absent contrary showing, that the trial court acted 
correctly and did not err, and that the court ,,vill correctly 
settle such questions as may arise in further proceedings 
in the cause. Indeed error is never presumed on appeal, but 
must be affirmatively shavvn by the record; and, since the 
appellate court need not search the record for possible 
errors, the burden of so showing it is on the party alleging it, 
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or, as sometimes stated, the burden of showing error 
affirmatively is upon appellant." 
Judy v. Reilly Atkinson & Co., 59 Idaho 752, 757, 87 P.2d 451, 453-454 (1939). 
Accord: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591, 598, 349 P.3d 1182, 1189 (2015). 
The State begins its new legal arguments by stating that the 2012 Idaho Fire Code 
sets the standard for water pressure fire-flow requirements for "buildings," including 
"dwellings." Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 9, ,i1. It is important to also recognize, however, 
that those requirements do not apply to water systems. 
The State contends that the district court found that the District had no 
jurisdiction to enforce the IFC fire flow requirements against a water company providing 
water to private fire hydrants. That contention, however, misstates the district court's 
decision. Id. p. 9, ,i2. What the district court actually found was " ... that the Company 
has met its burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction, and that Idaho Code §41-259 does 
not apply to the Company's water system." R. p. 166, ,i1. Under Idaho Code §41-259, a 
fire district's agent could inspect the buildings and premises of the Company, and that 
agent could order remediation or removal of any building or other structure which 
violated the IFC and therefore was especially liable to fire, and so situated to endanger 
life, other buildings or structures, or that building or structure. Idaho Code §41-259. 
What that statute does not do is to authorize a fire district agent to order remediation or 
removal of a water system that is designed and operated to only provide domestic water. 
The district court's decision in this case therefore has no implication limiting the 
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jurisdiction of the State or its representatives because that decision is entirely consistent 
v.rith the Idaho authorities defining the scope of that jurisdiction. 
A. The district court correctly interpreted and applied Idaho Code 
§41-259 in defining the enforcement authority of the District. 
The State argues that the district judge failed to both give Idaho Code §41-259 
liberal construction, and erred in failing to give any effect to the "building and premises" 
language stated in the first paragraph of the statute. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 11, ~3-
The State's criticism results from its misinterpretation of the statute. 
Both the phrases "buildings and premises," and "buildings and structures," need 
to be in the statute, and need to be in separate paragraphs. That is because those two 
phrases address two separate and distinct issues: Access and remedy. 
In the first paragraph of Idaho Code §41-259, the word "premises" is included to 
assure that the code official can have access onto the property in which the buildings and 
structures are located - the code official has to cross the premises to get to the building or 
structure. If this paragraph did not have the "premises" language, a non-compliant 
building owner would deny the code official the authority to enter the property for 
inspection purposes. 
In the second paragraph ofldaho Code §41-259, the phrase "buildings and 
structures" is there to clearly define what the code official may seek to remedy. By other 
language in that paragraph, which excludes single family homes and buildings on farms 
of a eertain size from enforcement authority, the legislature identified the limits for 
enforcement by the code official. The State is not actually requesting liberal construction 
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of the "premises" term, but instead is seeking to transplant it to another paragraph of 
Idaho Code §41l-259. The legislature obviously had the opportunity to give the code 
official authority to enforce fire codes against premises, or even water systems, but did 
not do so. 
From the beginning of this case, the district court wanted to give effect to the 
legislature's intent for Idaho Code §41-2s9. Tr. March 25, 2015 Order To Show Cause, 
p. 25, LL 14-16. The district court began with the literal words of the statute itself. Id. p. 
4, I. 18-p. 5, I. 13. The district court gave effect to the unambiguous and clearly-
expressed intent of the statute, as granting enforcement authority to the District for 
buildings and structures. Id. p. 25, 1. 20-p. 26, 1. 13. The district court accurately 
interpreted Idaho Code §41-259 as not giving enforcement authority over the Company. 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
legislative intent." "When interpreting a statute, the Court 
begins 'Ari.th the literal words of the statute .... " "If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislative body must be given effect .... " This 
Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous 
legislative enactment." (Internal citations omitted.) 
Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 88:.?, 380 P.3d 681, 695 (2016). 
The literal application of the statute makes perfect sense, based upon a correct 
understanding of the concept of access versus remedy. 
If the term "premises" were intended to include the Company's water lines, as the 
State argues, would that interpretation then also include all other utilities either in or 
above the ground, such as gas distribution pipelines, overhead power lines, and any other 
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public utilities? The State's interpretation of the statute could subject the natural gas and 
electrical power companies, as well as what could be more than 2,000 water purveyors in 
Idaho, to whatever the local fire chief decided to do under the Idaho fire laws. 
Contrary to the State's contention, the district court's decision correctly maintains 
the limits of the District's enforcement ability. It is uniquely the province of the 
legislature, and not the State, to change the wording of Idaho Code §41-259 to enlarge the 
jurisdictional boundaries of state fire officials. 
B. The district court correctly identified the limits of the District's 
enforcement}urisdiction based upon the District's stated basis for 
enforcement action against the Co:mpany. 
The District, in its Ordered (sic) Demanding Repair and Remedy of Deficiencies 
in Water System, cited as authority the JFC as stated in Idaho Code §41-253(1) through 
§41--269 and IDAPA 18.01.50. R. p. 25. The District did not cite or make any reference 
to its enabling statute, being the Fire Protection District Law, Idaho Code §31-1401 et 
seq. The District did not argue that law. The district court was therefore given no 
reason to analyze that law. 
The State is the only one to make these arguments. All the District does is to 
point to them by reference. This should not be allowed. The Washington Court of 
Appeals has persuasively stated: "On review, we decline to address issues raised for 
the first time on appeal, in reply briefs, or only in amicus briefs." (Emphasis added.) 
Joy v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 170 Wn. App. 614, 630, 285 P.3d 187, 194 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2012). Accord: Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island, 643 F.3d 16, 
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28, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10358, *33-34, 41 ELR 20191 (1st Cir. R.I. 2011). Because 
the District fai]ed to raise the issue, the State should not be allowed to try to do so for 
the first time on appeal. 
In its brief, the State argues various purposes, power and duties of fire districts. 
The State fails, however, to cite anything whatsoever in the Fire Protection District 
Law that would grant any enforcement authority to any representative of a local fire 
district. 
The issue on appeal is whether the District had jurisdiction for its intended 
enforcement action against the Company. The Fire Protection District Law has no 
provision of enforcement jurisdiction for fire district representatives. The district 
court should not be faulted by the State for failing to provide an analysis when there is 
nothing in the Fire Protection District Law to analyze. 
C. The Company has never taken the position that it was exempt 
from compliance with the IFC simply because it is a privately owned 
company. 
The State argues that the Company " ... contended that because it is a privately 
owned water company and not the proper owners (sic) of the fire hydrants hooked up 
to the system, it cannot be compelled to make modifications to comply with the IFC." 
Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 14, i11. That argument is incorrect. Instead, the Company 
stated in its Response to Order For Remedy and Request For Contested Hearing dated 
June 13, 2014, " ... that the District did not have jurisdiction over the Company's private 
water system." R. p. 14, i19. The Company's position has been consistent from the 
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beginning. In the Company's Petition For Writ of Prohibition, the Company stated its 
position that the District was without any statutory authority, jurisdiction or right to 
pursue its enforcement action against the Company. R. p. 386, ~4- Specifically, the 
Company did not claim exemption, it only stated the fact that the District lacked 
jurisdiction. 
Throughout its history, the Company has had, and still maintains today, a good 
working relationship with the governmental agencies that do have jurisdiction over the 
Company. For example, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") is 
the Company's primary governing agency. The Company continued in good standing 
with DEQ even after the District attempted the enforcement action that constitutes the 
basis of this case. R. p. 402 - 419. In its 2015 report on the Company's system, DEQ's 
position on fire flow was as follows: 
"The DEQ Engineering Department has reviewed the 
information provided regarding fire flow issues and has 
determined that since the SBWLLC (Company) was built in 
the 196o's and prior to fire flow or regulation, the current 
Rules which require that any drop in pressure below 20 psi 
in distribution, the operator must immediately provide 
public notification, disinfect the water system, and notify the 
DEQ. 
Although there may be pressure deficiencies during a fire 
emergency or routine hydrant flushing, it is preferable to 
keep the hydrants in place for the safety and protection of 
the residents and their property. The Department is not 
recommending the removal of the existing fire hydrants in 
order to reduce or correct any fire flow issues during flushing 
or fire events." 
R. p. 415, ~5 - p. 416, ~2. 
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The Idaho Public Utilities Commission ("IPUC") also regulates the Company. 
Tr. March 23, :2.016 hearing, p. 84, Ll. 16-19. It is also in good standing with IPUC. Id. 
p. 116, LL 21-24. It is instructive as to the motive of the District in this case that the 
regulation of the Company by the IPUC did not begin until 2015 and was caused by 
complaints from persons connected to the District. During its comment period on the 
beginning of the regulation of the Company, IPUC received 41 comments. Thirty of the 
Company's customers wrote positive comments to the IPUC. Of the other 11 
comments, seven were negative comments from persons connected with the District. 
R. pp. 200-201 and 210-218. 
The Company has willingly complied with each of those two governmental 
entities according to the jurisdictional authority of each. The Company is also in 
compliance with the District as to the scope of its enforcement authority under Idaho 
Code §41-259. If the State or the District is dissatisfied with the current jurisdictional 
authority granted by the Idaho legislature, that legislature, and not this Court, is the 
proper forum. 
II. The Company has not changed the character of its services to an extent 
of losing its grandfather status, and it has not waived that status. 
As to the grandfathered-rights discussion in the State's brief, once again, the 
State is attempting to raise that issue for the first time on appeal. Brief of Amicus 
Curiae, p. 16, ,J1 - p. 18, ,J2. A.<s more fully discussed above, regarding the State's 
attempt to argue the state fire protection laws, this Court should decline to address the 
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grandfathered--rights issue which the State attempts to raise for the first time in its 
amicus brief. 
The District only mentions the grandfathered-rights status on one occasion (R. 
p. 253), but that reference is made in regard to the District's objection to the attorney 
fees award to the Company. The grandfathered-rights status of the Company did not 
constitute an argument of the District's defense so as to preserve that issue for appeal. 
"The rule is we11 settled that a party cannot avail himself of a defense for the first time 
in the appellate court, nor will a question not raised in the trial court be considered on 
appeal." Grant v. St. James Mining Co., 33 Idaho 221, 222, 191 P. 359, 359, (1920). 
Nevertheless, the State begins this portion of its argument by stating that the 
Company" ... raised in its supporting documents that it has 'grandfathered rights' that 
exempt it from enforcement of the IFC." Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 16, i/1. [Although 
that argument is not about any of the issues on appeal (R. p. 311, i/3), the Company has 
responded to it for the sake of thoroughness.] That argument is not true. Instead, the 
Company has stated its belief that any attempt by the District to enforce the Order 
would be in contravention of the grandfathered rights recognized by the May 6, 2014 
letter from the DEQ. R. p. 433-434, iis. 
In the May 6, 2014 letter from DEQ to the District's fire chief, DEQ expressly 
recognized the Company's grandfathered rights: 
"It is agreed by all parties that though there may (be) 
pressure deficiencies when flushing the hydrants or even if 
there was a fire, it is preferable to keep the hydrants in place. 
Also discussed was an alternative to correct the fire flow 
15 
R. p. 447. 
pressure issue, which would be to remove the fire hydrants 
within the distribution system. However, this may not be in 
the best interests of the water users on the SBWCLLC system 
for protecting life and property. 
For your reference, the SBWCLLC water system was built in 
the 196o's prior to the first DEQ drinking water 
regulations ... .if the SBWCLLC plans to 'substantially modify' 
or add new service areas, these projects would trigger the 
requirements for maintaining a minimum 40 psi pressure 
during peak hour demand, excluding fire flow." 
The State also argues that "(t)he district court relied heavily on SBWC's 
assertions of private ownership and grandfathered rights to determine that only a legal 
question as to jurisdiction existed." Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 16, i-12. Not only does 
that statement 1ack any citation to any document in the record, but also it is not true. 
In fact, the word "grandfathered" does not even appear in the Memorandum Decision 
and Order Granting Writ of Prohibition from which the District takes this appeal. R. 
pp. 162-170. 
The State also alleges that " ... (t)he district court erred in failing to consider the 
question of fact that existed in the record as to whether SBWC had changed the 
character of its services from providing only potable water to also providing fire 
suppression services." Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 16, i-11. That allegation is incorrect 
for two reasons. First, the district court, in granting the motion of the Company for 
hearing the case on the papers, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 74, expressly stated as follows: 
"Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the 
parties, together vv:ith the sworn testimony and the foregoing 
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R p. 166, ,T1. 
affidavits, this Court is not persuaded that the District has 
jurisdiction over the Company under Idaho Code §41-259. 
The Court agrees with the testimony in the Bailey and Larsen 
(sic) affidavits that the Company's water system can in no 
way be construed as a "building or other structure which, for 
want of repairs ... or by reason of age or dilapidated condition, 
or due to violation of the International Fire Code or from 
other causes, is especially liable to fire, ... I.C. §41-259." 
It is therefore clear that the district court did give due consideration to the facts in 
reaching the decision to grant the petition for writ of prohibition. R. p. 166, ,T1. 
The second incorrect statement by the State in this regard is its allegation that 
" ... SBWC had changed the character of its services from providing only potable water 
to also providing fire suppression services." (Emphasis added.) Brief of Amicus 
Curiae, p. 16, ,T1. The State did not, and cannot, cite this Court to any portion of the 
record supporting its contention that the Company provided fire suppression services. 
To the contrary, the record is clear that every user, and the District itself, was on notice 
that the Company was expressly not providing anything beyond the supply of domestic 
water. R. p. 164, ,T2 - 165, ,T2. 
After agreeing to the existence and validity of grandfather rights, even under the 
IFC, the State argues that the Company because of " ... expansion and change of use .... " 
has lost those rights. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 17, ,T2. The problem with this 
argument is that none of the bullet point items listed constitutes either "expansion" or 
"change of use." The Company instead has taken several actions to improve its water 
service to its users and to increase its reserve water supply. R. pp. 39-41. There has 
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also been no change of use. The Company has continued in its historic role to provide 
domestic water service to its customers. 
When considering the improvements that the Company has made on its system, 
it is difficult to square the State's arguments with the District's stated concerns for the 
safety of the residents of the Company's service area. If there were really such a 
pressing safety concern, why has the District delayed over 19 years before attempting 
to take enforcement action against the Company? If the District were truly concerned 
about what it cl.aims are insufficient fire flows, why hasn't the District taken actions on 
its own part to address that concern. Those actions could have included mitigating the 
alleged inadequate water supply by efforts to keep additional construction from taking 
place, trying to require sprinklers in bui:ldings with inadequate fire suppression water 
supplies, securing additional large diameter supply hoses to bring water to poorly 
served areas, adopting preplans, establishing strategies and tactics to deal with the 
water supply concerns, making educational outreach to property owners the District 
contends are affected, or seeking automatic mutual aid agreements with nearby fire 
agencies. The May 6, 2014 letter to the District's fire chief from DEQ confirmed DEQ's 
understanding that the Company and the District would work together to resolve the 
fire hydrant issue in the best interests of the Schweitzer community. R. p. 405. We 
can only wonder how many improvements and mitigation factors could have been 
funded by the money that the District has forced the parties to spend litigating this 
case. 
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As recently as 2014, DEQ recognized the fact that the Company had 
grandfathered rights in its existing water system. DEQ also stated that the Company 
would only trigger the requirement for maintaining a 40 psi pressure during peak hour 
demand, excluding fire flow, if the Company had plans to "substantially modify" or 
"add new service areas." R. p. 416, i12. Neither of those events has occurred since the 
date of that letter. 
The State's final argument is that the district court erred in narrowly focusing 
the issues as only the legal question of jurisdiction without further investigation of the 
record. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 18, ,i1. The district court should not be subject to 
criticism for doing its job well and dealing vvith the threshold issue of jurisdiction 
before determining other issues in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly interpreted and applied the statute defining the 
scope of enforcement authority of the District to "buildings and structures." That was 
an accurate and literal application of I.C. §41-259, which is the statute that clearly 
provided the parameters of what the Idaho legislature intended the District to have for 
enforcement authority. If affirmed, the district court decision will uphold the 
legislative intent of that statute, and Idaho fire officials will continue to have the access 
and inspection authority that will help to protect life and property. The district court 
decision will have no impact upon the State except to reaffirm the fire safety access, 
inspection and remedy abilities that the Idaho legislature intended. The Company 
firmly believes that an opinion from this Court affirming the district court decision is 
called for by the literal application of Idaho Code §41-259 to the facts of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this-~+.; of August, 2017. 
Steve Smith " 
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